PurposeI have two overall aims with my blog. One is to illustrate that contemporary pro-diversity atheists are actually ideologues masquerading as humanists, who are leading us down the road to hell. The other is to develop my own philosophy, which roughly involves running in the exact opposite direction whilst channelling Enoch Powell yelling:
"we must be mad, literally mad!"Exploring the ideas of atheist philosopher Alonzo Fyfe curiously gives me the opportunity to do both at the same time. So I will take a few posts to explore his theory, application, and contrast that with my own outlook.
Summary
Atheist
Alonzo Fyfe advocates an interesting philosophy called
desire utilitarianism. I find his theory agreeable, but its application disappointing. Whilst he refreshingly bases morality on human desires, he nonetheless arrives at all-too-common emotion-suppressing and reason-blind pro-diversity conclusions which have more in common with servitude to ideology than to human desires. His premise that desires are malleable, whilst sometimes true, was a bridge too far for me when he summarily dismissed the desire for racial/ethnic homogeneity as "bigotry". I suspect that many atheists will likewise be disappointed.
My unqualified verdict: close, Alonzo, but no cigar.
Below is an introduction to Alonzo's theory. Whilst I don't really understand it yet, it does sound mostly agreeable (more so when applied within the confines of an ethnic group) and worth exploring further.
Good IntentionsFyfe's motivation starts in high school when he learned the body count of the American Civil War. He vowed to leave the world a better place, but pondered "What is
better?". And so began his journey into philosophy which eventually settled on desire utilitarianism. From
A Better Place: Essays on Desire Utilitarianism:
When I was young I decided to try to leave the world better than it would have been if I had never lived. To do this, I had to know what ‘A Better Place’ actually was. Thus, I spent 12 years in college studying moral philosophy... I argue that we cannot reliably find those answers in scripture, in subjective sentiment, or in evolved dispositions. In fact, those who look in these places for answers often leave the world worse than it would have otherwise been. Instead, I argue for ‘desire utilitarianism’ – the idea that morality involves using praise and condemnation to promote desires that tend to fulfill other desires, and to inhibit desires that tend to thwart other desires.
BDI PsychologyDesire utilitarianism is based on
BDI Theory:
... a theory of mind called BDI Theory (... Belief - Desire - Intention Theory). This theory holds that beliefs and desires are brain states, that these brain states combine to form intentions, and intentions then cause intentional actions.
And
desire utilitarianism is ...
... a theory which is compatible with the most widely accepted theory of human action -- that they are caused by beliefs and desires, and humans act as if their beliefs are true.
... there is no value without desire, but insofar as desires exist in the world of fact, then so do values.
Sounds good. At last an honest atheist who is willing to justify morality without using the crutch of prevailing culture. Here is
more I agree with:
One can stack as many beliefs as one wants into a human brain, yet no action is implied about these beliefs. It is like sticking data into a database, no set of data implies that the database should do something. Yet, the instant you add even a single desire to this set, there is a reason to do something.
I agree. That's why my blog description is: "I feel, therefore I think".
Desire UtilitarianismWhat is desire utilitarianism? I don't understand it yet, but here is a
taste:
A good desire is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires, and a bad desire is a desire that tends to thwart other desires. The evaluation of actions is derived from an evaluation of desires, and an evaluation of desires stands at the heart of morality...
We are not seeking to maximize pleasure over pain, or happiness over unhappiness. We are seeking to maximize desire fulfillment over desire thwarting. The purpose is to make true the propositions that are the objects of desire, and to focus more on those propositions that are the objects of stronger desires...
Hey, what's wrong with happiness over unhappiness? I guess he's taking a big picture approach to satisfying our collective desires, rather than a narrow-minded selfish approach.
Why Desirism is Not a Short List Theory:
They hear the term “desire fulfillment” and they then assume it is just another short-list theory with “desire fulfillment” as the only thing on the list. They then assume that desirism falls victim to the problems that they know exists with short-list theories.
However, desirism is a long-list theory. It is a very long list theory. It has, on its list, every single thing that is the object of a desire.
Nothing has intrinsic value – not even desire fulfillment. It is not the case that our lives should be spent filling the universe with as much desire fulfillment as possible. There are too many other things on the very long list that we should also be filling the universe with to waste all that effort on desire fulfillment.
By the way, some of the things on this long list are human welfare and flourishing, happiness, well-being, health, and avoiding harm and suffering.
As an added bonus, desire-fulfillment can tell you what “well-being”, “flourishing”, “health”, and “harm” actually are. It has the ability to unpack these terms, and not simply use them to avoid answering the question by stating the question in different terms.
A long list is OK, but I thought
everything was reducible to "as much desire fulfillment as possible" in BDI theory. My head is starting to hurt. Here is a quote
attributed to Alonzo on the scope of desires to be considered:
What desires are relevant in determining whether a desire is a virtue? All other desires, actually, regardless of who has them. Honesty tends to fulfill other desires. So does compassion.
Malleable DesiresHere he talks about the
malleability of desires:
Of all of the desires that we may have, moral evaluations focus only on those that are malleable -- that can be changed by environmental influences. Morality is not concerned with desires that are hard wired. Desires that are subject to environmental influences are desires that can be changed, and it is only with respect to desires that can be changed that it makes sense to ask "What desires should we have?". So, for example, our aversion to pain sits as a background condition to moral considerations, like acceleration due to gravity and the chemical composition of tree bark.
Why focus only on desires that can be changed through environmental influence? This is because the question that lies at the root of all moral concepts is, "What types of desires should we have?" Morality is concerned with using environmental factors to control the desires that exist, promoting desire-fulfilling desires and inhibiting desire-thwarting desires.
It is also relevant that, by far, the most powerful tools to use in influencing the desires that exist are reward and punishment. Praise and reward an action, and the desires that motivate that action become stronger. Condemn and punish an action, and the desires that cause that action are repressed. One does not even need to condemn or punish an actual instance, but simply make it known that a particular action is 'of a type that is to be condemned', and an aversion to that act type is nourished. We learn an aversion to rape and to killing innocent people, most of us, without ever having to be actually punished for a rape or a murder.
Fair enough. So, by now I'm confused but still nodding and still interested.
Luke Muehlhauser has written
What Is Morality? based on desire utilitarianism, which Alonzo has linked from his
blog:
CHAPTER 1 -- GOOD AND BAD
If you're like most people, you make your moral decisions the same way they did. You close your eyes, shut out distractions, and ask your conscience. And then your conscience - your moral feeling - delivers you the answer.
That is exactly how racists, sexists, bigots, fascists, religious zealots, and violent people throughout history answered their moral questions.
We're going to have to find a more accurate way to answer moral questions...
How are we going to pick the winner? How do we know which theory, if any, will truly help us make the world better?
We can’t choose the winner based on how well it conforms to what our conscience tells us. Your conscience is just a product of evolution and culture. Two centuries ago, your conscience would have told you that racism and sexism were good. Your conscience cannot be trusted.
We are not looking for the theory that we like. We’re looking for a theory that - just like any good scientific theory - accurately describes our universe. You “become” a utilitarian or a Kantian the same way you “become” an atomist. It doesn’t matter whether you like the idea that matter is made of tiny atoms; it only matters whether or not that is true....
Chapter 7 -- MORAL VALUE THAT REALLY EXISTS
... What is moral value?
Morality is concerned with reasons for action. Reasons for action to feed the poor. Reasons for action to be kind to others. Reasons for action to not torture children.
But we’ve had a tough time finding reasons for action that really exist. Intrinsic value doesn’t seem to exist. Neither do duties or gods.
So are there any reasons for action that actually exist?
Yes.
Desires exist.
In fact, as far as we know, desires are the only reasons for action that do exist.
If the poor did not desire to be fed, there would be no reason for action to feed them. If children did not desire to avoid torture, there would be no reason for action to avoid torturing children. If we all had desires not to eat food but to soak up sunlight, then we would have no reason for action to feed the poor. Instead, we’d have reasons for action to give them access to sunlight. Desire is the source of all moral value...
Good and bad
Since desire is the only reason for action that exists, something is “good” if it fulfills the desires in question. Something is “bad” if it thwarts the desires in question. It’s that simple...
Moral value
When we talk about moral value, though, we are talking about something universal. My desire for Angelina Jolie to sleep with me does not mean she is morally obligated to sleep with me. Universal moral claims require a consideration of all desires.
So when talking about universal morality, “the desires in question” are all desires. So, “morally good” means “such as to fulfill more and greater desires than are thwarted, among all desires.” And “morally bad” means “such as to thwart more and greater desires than are fulfilled, among all desires.”
For there is no reason to exclude certain desires from the evaluation. We cannot even exclude the rapist’s desires to rape. No desire is intrinsically better or worse than any other desire, because intrinsic value does not exist.
Instead, we must evaluate the moral value of desires in the exact same way we evaluate the moral value of everything else! We ask, “How well does this desire fulfill or tend to fulfill other desires?
Evaluating desires
A desire to rape is bad because it tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills. A desire to show kindness is good because it tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts...
Morality is concerned with desires that everybody should have, or that nobody should have. The question of whether rape is a good or bad desire is answered by asking, "What if everybody had a desire to rape?" Likewise, we can ask, "What would happen if everybody had a desire to see through their own biases?"
CHAPTER 8 -- OBJECTIONS
Aren’t you just saying that desire fulfillment has intrinsic value?
No. That would be “desire fulfillment act utilitarianism,” not desire utilitarianism.
Desire fulfillment does not have intrinsic value. Moral value comes from reasons for action,and it so happens that desires are the only reasons for action that exist.
Each desire is its own reason for action, and we must consider all of them, for no desire is intrinsically better or worse than any other.
Let’s use an example to make clear the differences between “desire utilitarianism” and “desire fulfillment act utilitarianism.”
Say there are 20 sadists who desire to torture a child, and one child who desires to not be tortured. Desire fulfillment act utilitarianism would say it is good for the sadists to torture the child, because that is the act that would maximize desire fulfillment.
In contrast, desire utilitarianism evaluates desires themselves, based on their tendency to fulfill or thwart other desires. The desire to torture children tends to thwart more and greater desires than it fulfills, so it is a bad desire. A person with good desires would not torture children, so torturing children is a wrong action to perform.
That’s the difference between desire utilitarianism and desire fulfillment act utilitarianism.
But remember, we should not accept desire utilitarianism because it gives us answers that feel good, like “torturing children is bad.” History and biology show us that we have not evolved a “sixth sense” to detect moral value directly through our feelings. So, we can’t accept or reject any moral theory based on how well it fits our moral feelings. Our moral feelings could be totally wrong. For example, they seem to have been wrong in the past, when everyone accepted tribalism, sexism, racism, and homophobia as morally good.
The only way to choose a moral theory is to ask if it accurately describes what really exists in the universe, the same way we would accept a scientific theory. In the earlier chapters I showed why only desire utilitarianism accurately describes how moral value exists in the universe, and that is the only good reason to accept desire utilitarianism; not because it is nice, but because it is true.
What about animals, plants, and bacteria? Don’t they have desires for life and growth, too?
If animals, plants, and bacteria have desires, they are just as morally relevant as human desires.
Desire, as far as we can tell, is a brain state. Plants and bacteria do not even have nervous systems. So, they do not have desires.
But animals have brains. So, do animals have desires?
Yes, probably. The problem is, we don’t know which ones...
We have a similar but easier scientific problem with regard to human newborns. Does a recently fertilized egg have desires? No; it doesn’t have a brain... At what point does this human brain develop desires, and how many, how quickly? Again, we must await the results of science.
Back to animals. We can be sure that at least some animals have desires, and their desires require moral consideration. There is no reason to discount the desires of other species. We might as well discount the desires of other races, which is silly. All desires create reasons for action.
So, does this burden humanity with taking care of every last worm? Must we protect every prey from every predator? Should we set up a welfare system for cattle? Surely this is too burdensome, too inconvenient to even think about!
But this is not a good objection. Desire utilitarianism is a theory about what exists; what is true about reasons for action in the universe; what is true about morality. A complaint about its unpleasantness is no objection to its truth. We cannot say that the sun will not explode in 5 billion years because the thought of our destruction is unpleasant.
Second, it may not be true that desire utilitarianism prescribes that we protect every little worm. “Animals rights” is a complex topic.
CHAPTER 9 -- HOW TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE
So now that we have a sketch of what moral value there is in our universe, how do we use this knowledge to make the world a better place? What ought we to do?
As we’ve seen, “ought” questions are about reasons for actions that exist, and it turns out that desires are the only reasons for action that exist. So, in any given situation we ought to do what a person with good desires would do. A good desire is one that tends to fulfill more and greater desires than it thwarts, considering all desires.
Conclusion
We have surveyed the evidence about what really exists in the universe, and discovered that objective and universal moral value does exist. We can make the world a genuinely better place.
Our ancestors tried and usually failed to make the world a better place, because they didn’t have a correct notion of what “better” was. We need not repeat the mistakes of every generation that has come before us, because we are now equipped with knowledge of what “better” really is.
So, let’s go make the world a better place!
OK, now the nodding has stopped and the eyebrow raising has begun:
- the summary dismissal of "tribalism, sexism, racism, and homophobia" is quite a leap. No doubt there is much extremism in those arcane desires to be wary of, but I can also see a lot of good in them that shouldn't be so readily dismissed.
- "Desire fulfillment does not have intrinsic value"? It sure feels like it does to me.
- I'm not sure the leap from desires to "because it is true" is justified.
- "no desire is intrinsically better or worse than any other" sounds radically at odds with our natural preference for self over other, and ingroup over outgroup.
Anyway, whilst desire utilitarianism sounds interesting in theory, its application takes a breathtaking leap from desires to pro-diversity opinions. Alonzo's personal views reinforce the pro-diversity stance, as I will show in my next post.
But, the theory remains interesting, particularly if applied within the confines of an ethnic group (which does not automatically imply that groups will be antagonistic towards each other).
Anyway, if you want to learn more, follow
CommonSenseAtheism which is posting some entertaining podcasts on the subject.
And
here are a
couple of video introductions.
Conservatives, I believe, are much much wiser about the limitations of the individual, about the flaws of reasoning, and about the need to anchor us in a past. Liberals tend to be very high on openness to experience, liberals love change, love diversity, "the very fact that something is an old idea is a reason to doubt it, it probably comes from a time of patriarchy, it's outdated".
